Master Foundational contracts case allowing a breaching party to recover in restitution for benefits conferred, subject to deduction for the other party’s damages. with this comprehensive case brief.
Britton v. Turner is a landmark 19th-century contracts case that reshaped the common law’s approach to “entire” contracts and the availability of restitution following breach. At a time when the strict rule of entire performance (exemplified by cases like Cutter v. Powell) could deny any compensation to a party who failed to fully complete performance, Britton introduced a more equitable principle: when an employer has received and retained the benefits of partial performance, the breaching worker may recover the reasonable value of those benefits, reduced by the employer’s provable damages caused by the breach.
The decision is a cornerstone for understanding the interplay between contract law’s expectation interest and restitution’s unjust enrichment concerns. It teaches that even a willful breacher is not invariably barred from recovery if the other party would otherwise be unjustly enriched. Modern doctrine, including Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 374, reflects Britton’s insight that restitution functions as a corrective against forfeiture where benefits have been conferred and retained.
6 N.H. 481 (N.H. 1834)
The plaintiff, Britton, entered into an employment agreement with the defendant, Turner, to work for one year at a fixed wage of $120, payable at the end of the year. The contract thus made full completion a condition precedent to payment. After working for roughly nine months (variously reported as about nine months and a few days), Britton voluntarily left the employment without legal justification before the year expired. Turner had not paid any portion of the wages and, under the contract’s terms, owed nothing unless the year was completed. Britton nonetheless sued in assumpsit on a common count for quantum meruit to recover the reasonable value of the services Turner had received and retained. At trial, the court instructed the jury that, despite the plaintiff’s breach, he could recover the value of the services actually rendered if Turner accepted and benefited from them, but that any damages Turner suffered from the premature departure should be deducted from the recovery. The jury returned a verdict awarding Britton compensation for his labor (often reported as $95), and Turner appealed, arguing that because the contract was entire and Britton did not fully perform, Britton should take nothing.
May a party who breaches an entire employment contract by failing to complete performance recover, in quantum meruit, the reasonable value of services conferred and accepted by the other party, subject to deduction for damages caused by the breach?
Where one party, though in breach of an entire contract, has conferred and the other party has accepted and retained a measurable benefit, the breaching party may recover in restitution (quantum meruit) the reasonable value of that benefit, reduced by any damages the nonbreaching party proves were caused by the breach. The agreed contract price is evidence of value and operates as a practical ceiling on recovery so that the breaching party does not obtain more than the value contemplated by the contract.
Yes. A breaching employee who fails to complete an entire one-year contract may recover the reasonable value of the services actually received and retained by the employer, less the employer’s damages attributable to the breach. The jury’s award was affirmed.
The court rejected the rigid doctrine that an entire contract conditions any payment on full performance, observing that such a rule could enable an employer to accept and keep valuable partial performance yet pay nothing, resulting in unjust enrichment and disproportionate forfeiture. The court emphasized that Turner had received the benefit of Britton’s labor for most of the year and that denying all recovery would award Turner a windfall not contemplated by the parties’ bargain. Restitution, as the court applied it, does not rewrite the contract or excuse breach; rather, it prevents unjust enrichment by requiring payment of the net value retained, while fully protecting the nonbreaching party through a setoff for consequential and expectation losses. The court noted that the contract price informs the valuation of the services and prevents the breaching party from obtaining more than was agreed. At the same time, the nonbreaching party bears the burden to prove actual damages from the breach; where those damages are substantial (e.g., the cost of hiring a substitute at higher wages or losses from disrupted operations), they diminish or eliminate the breaching party’s recovery. Conversely, where the benefit retained exceeds the proven damages, the law will allow a net recovery in quantum meruit. In so holding, the court expressly departed from the harshness of the traditional “entire contract” rule, aligning the law of contracts with equitable principles of restitution. The opinion reconciles competing policies: enforcing promises and discouraging breach, on the one hand, and avoiding forfeiture and unjust enrichment, on the other, by allowing recovery only to the extent of the net benefit conferred and retained.
Britton v. Turner is a foundational case for the doctrine that a breaching party may obtain restitution to the extent of benefits conferred, subject to the nonbreaching party’s damages. It marks a shift from strict forfeiture under entire contracts to a more nuanced, equitable approach focused on unjust enrichment and net gains. Law students study Britton to understand the relationship between expectation damages (the traditional contract remedy) and restitution (focused on the defendant’s enrichment), and to see how courts calibrate remedies to avoid windfalls while still respecting contractual allocation of risk. The case is routinely paired with Cutter v. Powell and modern Restatement provisions (notably § 374) to illustrate the development of American contract remedies, the limits of recovery by a willful breacher, and how courts measure and cap restitution by reference to the contract price and proven damages.
Yes. The plaintiff voluntarily left before the end of the term, and the court nonetheless permitted restitution because the employer had accepted and retained the benefit of the plaintiff’s labor. However, recovery is limited to the net benefit: any damages the employer proves (e.g., costs of replacement labor, loss from the disruption) must be deducted, and the contract price serves as evidence and a practical cap on value. Some jurisdictions later tempered recovery for willful or bad-faith breaches, but Britton itself allows it.
The measure is the reasonable value of the services conferred and retained, often informed by a pro rata portion of the contract price, minus the nonbreaching party’s proven damages from the breach. The contract price is persuasive evidence of value and operates as a ceiling to prevent the breaching party from obtaining more than the benefit contemplated by the bargain. If the damages equal or exceed the value of the benefit, the breaching party takes nothing.
Acceptance is critical. Restitution is available because the defendant received and retained a benefit. In an employment context, the employer necessarily accepts services as they are performed. If the nonbreaching party rejects or cannot use the partial performance, or if the work confers no measurable benefit, restitution may be denied or limited because there is no unjust enrichment to rectify.
Britton departs from the strict forfeiture approach exemplified by Cutter v. Powell (which denied recovery under an entire contract absent full completion). Modern doctrine, as reflected in Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 374, largely embraces Britton’s principle: a breaching party may obtain restitution for benefits conferred to the extent they exceed the other party’s loss. Thus, Britton is a key step in the evolution from strict performance conditions to unjust enrichment-based limits on forfeiture.
No. Restitution is an alternative measure focused on the defendant’s enrichment, not the plaintiff’s lost expectancy. The nonbreaching party remains entitled to expectation damages (or their equivalent) as a setoff against the breaching party’s claim. The court’s approach ensures the nonbreaching party is made whole before any net restitution is awarded to the breacher.
Generally no. The contract price is strong evidence of reasonable value and functions as a cap to avoid giving the breacher a better deal than performance would have yielded. While “reasonable value” frames the inquiry, courts apply the contract rate to avoid overcompensation; any proven damages are then deducted. Thus, net recovery will not exceed what the contract contemplated for the services rendered.
Britton v. Turner endures because it reconciles the law’s commitment to enforcing bargains with its resistance to unjust enrichment. By allowing a breaching party restitution for the net benefit conferred and retained, the court avoided a draconian forfeiture while preserving the nonbreaching party’s right to be made whole through setoff.
For students and practitioners, the case frames a central remedial choice: expectation damages versus restitution. It also anchors a series of modern rules—most prominently Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 374—showing how courts use restitution to calibrate remedies, deter opportunism, and prevent windfalls without undermining the basic structure of contract enforcement.