Master House of Lords held no negligence where the risk of a cricket ball leaving the ground and injuring a passerby was exceedingly small and reasonable precautions had been taken. with this comprehensive case brief.
Bolton v. Stone is a foundational House of Lords decision clarifying when a defendant breaches the duty of care in negligence where the risk of harm is highly unlikely. The case is often taught alongside Donoghue v. Stevenson and Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks to illustrate how the standard of the reasonable person accounts not only for foreseeability in the abstract, but for the likelihood and magnitude of the risk, the gravity of potential harm, and the burden and practicality of further precautions. It anchors what many students learn as the risk–utility or risk–benefit calculus in breach analysis.
The decision stands for the proposition that a mere possibility of harm does not automatically require additional precautions: if the probability is so small that a reasonable person would not anticipate injury, failure to take further steps is not negligent. Bolton v. Stone thus mediates between ensuring safety and permitting socially useful activities—like community sport—without imposing an unrealistically high standard of care based on remote possibilities.
Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850 (HL); [1951] 1 All ER 1078
Miss Stone was standing on a public road adjacent to a cricket ground in Cheetham, Manchester, when she was struck and injured by a cricket ball hit from the ground. The club had long played at the ground, which was bordered by a high protective fence (approximately 17 feet) and situated such that the wicket was roughly 100 yards from the point on the road where Miss Stone was hit. Evidence showed that balls very rarely left the ground—approximately half a dozen times over nearly three decades—and no prior injuries had been recorded. The defendant club had maintained the fence and the ground’s configuration for many years; local residents, including the plaintiff, were aware of the occasional escape of balls, but such occurrences were exceptional. Miss Stone sued in negligence (and also alleged nuisance), arguing the club failed to take adequate precautions to prevent balls from leaving the ground and injuring passersby.
Does a defendant breach the duty of care in negligence when a foreseeable harm materializes, even if the probability of that harm was exceedingly small and reasonable precautions were already in place?
A defendant breaches the duty of care only if a reasonable person, in the defendant’s position, would have foreseen a real (not merely far‑fetched) risk of injury and would have taken additional precautions in light of the likelihood and gravity of the harm and the burden and practicality of further safeguards. Where the chance of injury is so small that a reasonable person would not anticipate it and would not take more precautions, failure to do so is not negligent.
No breach of duty; the club was not negligent. The risk of a ball leaving the ground and injuring a passerby was so small, given the distance and protective fence and the rarity of past occurrences, that a reasonable person would not have taken additional precautions.
The House of Lords emphasized that negligence law does not require guarding against every conceivable possibility of harm. The standard is that of the reasonable person, which turns on the magnitude and probability of the risk, the gravity of potential harm, and the practicality and burden of precautions. While it was conceivable that a cricket ball might be hit out of the ground, the relevant question was whether the risk was sufficiently probable that a reasonable person would have taken further measures beyond those already in place. Several factual elements showed the risk was exceedingly small: the wicket was a substantial distance from the road; the protective fence was high; and, critically, only about six balls had left the ground over roughly 30 years, with no prior injuries. Against this backdrop, the social utility of playing cricket and the costs and feasibility of further precautions (e.g., moving the wicket significantly, raising the fence further, or abandoning play) weighed against requiring more safety measures. The Lords concluded that the mere fact that injury eventually occurred did not retroactively prove the risk was one that required action; ex post occurrence cannot substitute for ex ante probability. As to nuisance, the infrequency of balls leaving the ground meant there was no unreasonable interference with the use of the highway or neighboring property. Accordingly, the club had acted reasonably. Because the probability of injury was so slight that a reasonable person would not have anticipated the need for additional precautions, there was no breach and thus no negligence.
Bolton v. Stone is a staple in torts for calibrating breach of duty where risks are remote. It teaches that foreseeability alone is insufficient; courts must evaluate the likelihood of harm, gravity of potential injury, and the burden/utility of alternative precautions. The case helps students see how courts avoid imposing de facto strict liability on socially valuable activities by refusing to require safeguards against highly improbable harms. It also provides a counterpoint to cases emphasizing the gravity of harm (e.g., Paris v. Stepney), and foreshadows later articulations of risk–utility balancing, reinforcing that negligence doctrine is sensitive to both probability and consequence.
No. Foreseeability remains essential, but Bolton clarifies that foreseeability must be coupled with a sufficient likelihood of harm. A mere possibility is not enough; the question is whether a reasonable person would have taken additional precautions given the probability and gravity of harm and the burden of precautions.
Likely yes. A history of frequent escapes or prior injuries would increase the probability of harm, making additional precautions more clearly required. Under Bolton’s reasoning, higher likelihood (especially with evidence of prior incidents) would shift the balance toward finding a breach for not adopting reasonable safeguards.
Bolton exemplifies risk–utility balancing: courts weigh the probability of harm and its potential severity against the burden, cost, and practicality of precautions and the activity’s social utility. Where risk is remote and precautions would be onerous or would unduly impair a socially valuable activity, failure to adopt them is not negligent.
No. The decision does not immunize sports clubs; it applies the general negligence standard. If a sport creates a non-trivial risk to neighbors or passersby and reasonable precautions are not taken, liability can follow. The key is the ex ante likelihood and magnitude of the risk relative to reasonable precautions.
Bolton warns against using the fact that harm occurred to infer that precautions were required. Breach is judged ex ante: the defendant’s conduct must be assessed based on what a reasonable person would have anticipated before the accident, not on the outcome.
Yes. The House of Lords rejected the nuisance claim, reasoning that the infrequency of balls leaving the ground meant there was no substantial or unreasonable interference. This reinforces that both negligence and nuisance analyses hinge on the frequency and character of the risk or interference.
Bolton v. Stone marks a crucial limit on negligence liability where the risk of injury is only a remote possibility. The House of Lords refused to equate mere foreseeability with breach, insisting that the standard of care tracks the actual probability of harm, the severity of potential injury, and the practicality and social cost of precautions.
For students, the case is a lasting reminder that negligence doctrine polices the line between reasonable safety and over-deterrence. By situating breach within a structured risk–utility analysis, Bolton continues to guide courts in balancing individual safety against the practical realities and social value of everyday activities.