Master English tort case imposing strict liability on a circus for injuries caused by its elephant despite provocation by dogs. with this comprehensive case brief.
Behrens v. Bertram Mills Circus is a leading English Court of Appeal decision on strict liability for wild animals (animals ferae naturae). It squarely confirms that keepers of inherently dangerous species—such as elephants—are liable for harm characteristic of those animals regardless of the care exercised. The case is frequently cited alongside classic authorities like May v. Burdett and Filburn v. People’s Palace and Aquarium to illustrate the common-law rule that wild animal keepers answer in damages without proof of negligence.
The decision is also important for its treatment of contributory negligence and imputed fault in this strict liability context. The court recognized that the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 can reduce damages where a claimant’s own fault contributes to the harm, but it refused to impute one claimant’s fault to another—in particular, a spouse—who was personally free of blame. Thus, Behrens both entrenches strict liability for wild animals and clarifies the interaction between that doctrine and modern comparative fault principles.
[1957] 2 QB 1 (CA); [1957] 2 All ER 583
Bertram Mills Circus operated a traveling show that included a number of elephants. While the elephants were being walked in public near the circus, two dogs belonging to the plaintiffs (Mr. and Mrs. Behrens) ran toward the elephants and barked at them. Startled and alarmed by the dogs, one elephant swung or lashed out with its trunk. In the course of this reaction, Mrs. Behrens was struck and injured, and the dogs were also injured. The plaintiffs brought actions for (1) Mrs. Behrens’s personal injuries, (2) Mr. Behrens’s own injuries and consequential losses, and (3) property damage relating to the dogs. The circus contended that it had exercised all due care in handling the animals, that the incident was provoked by the plaintiffs’ dogs, and that any recovery should be barred or reduced by contributory negligence. The matter reached the Court of Appeal after findings favorable to the plaintiffs on liability.
Are keepers of a wild animal (an elephant) strictly liable for injuries caused when the animal, alarmed by barking dogs, lashes out and injures persons and property; and, if so, can the defendants avoid or limit liability by alleging provocation and contributory negligence, including imputation of one claimant’s fault to another?
At common law, the keeper of an animal ferae naturae is strictly liable for damage of a kind that is likely to be caused by such an animal. Liability does not depend on proof of negligence or knowledge of dangerous propensity, and the exercise of reasonable care is not a defense. Defenses are limited and include consent, act of God, a true novus actus interveniens, and the claimant’s own fault; under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, a claimant’s fault may reduce (but not necessarily bar) recovery. Fault is not imputed between separate claimants; each claim stands or falls on the claimant’s own conduct.
Yes. The circus, as keeper of a wild animal (an elephant), was strictly liable for injuries sustained when the elephant reacted dangerously to barking dogs. The provocation by dogs did not provide a complete defense. Contributory negligence may reduce damages where a claimant’s own fault contributed, but one claimant’s fault is not imputed to another; an innocent claimant (such as Mrs. Behrens) recovers without reduction.
The Court of Appeal classified elephants as animals ferae naturae—species inherently likely to cause severe harm if they do cause harm. Under the common law’s strict liability rule, keepers of such animals are liable for damage of the kind that is characteristic of the danger posed by the species, and it is no answer to say that the keeper exercised due care. An elephant’s instinctive reaction when startled—particularly when provoked by barking dogs—is a paradigmatic manifestation of that danger. The very rationale of strict liability is that the exceptional risk created by keeping wild animals is borne by the keeper. The defendants argued that the dogs’ barking constituted provocation or a superseding cause that should absolve or substantially limit liability. The court rejected this as a complete defense: provocation of this sort is foreseeable in public spaces and does not break the chain of causation. Nevertheless, the court accepted that the 1945 Act applies to strict liability in tort. Where a claimant’s own fault contributes to the damage—such as negligently failing to control their own dogs—damages may be reduced proportionately. Crucially, the court refused to impute one claimant’s fault to another. Thus, any fault on Mr. Behrens’s part in handling the dogs could not diminish Mrs. Behrens’s recovery for her personal injuries because her claim depended on her own conduct, which was blameless. By contrast, claims for damage to the dogs or Mr. Behrens’s own injuries could, in principle, be subject to apportionment if his fault was found to have contributed. The circus’s due care, however exemplary, could not negate primary liability because the tort is one of strict liability for wild animals.
Behrens cements the modern articulation of strict liability for wild animals in English law and clarifies its interaction with contributory negligence after the 1945 Act. It teaches three exam-worthy points: (1) keepers of dangerous species are strictly liable for characteristic harms even absent negligence; (2) foreseeable provocations (like barking dogs) do not constitute a complete defense; and (3) contributory negligence may reduce damages for a claimant who is personally at fault, but fault is not imputed to an innocent co-claimant (e.g., a spouse). The case continues to be cited in discussions of the pre-Animals Act 1971 common law and remains instructive when interpreting the statutory scheme’s treatment of dangerous species.
No. Strict liability means the keeper is liable without proof of negligence for harms characteristic of the species, but defenses and limitations still apply. The claimant’s own fault can reduce damages under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, and recognized defenses (e.g., consent, act of God, or a true intervening act) may apply. Due care by the keeper, however, is not a defense to primary liability.
No. The Court of Appeal held that barking dogs startling an elephant is a foreseeable circumstance of public handling of such animals and does not break causation or bar strict liability. At most, if a claimant’s own failure to control the dogs contributed to the harm, that claimant’s damages could be reduced for contributory negligence.
No. The court emphasized that fault is not imputed between separate claimants. Since Mrs. Behrens was personally blameless, her claim for personal injuries was not reduced, even if her husband might have been at fault in controlling the dogs.
Under the Animals Act 1971, elephants are a dangerous species, so section 2(1) would generally impose strict liability on the keeper for damage. The same defenses, including claimant fault (section 5), could limit or defeat recovery. Thus, the practical outcome would likely be the same: liability for the elephant’s keeper, with potential reduction for any claimant fault.
Negligence is not required to establish liability for keepers of dangerous species, but it can still be litigated in related ways—e.g., when arguing contributory negligence by the claimant, or in separate negligence claims against handlers or owners. In Behrens, the circus’s exercise of care did not defeat strict liability, though claimant fault could affect damages.
Harm of the kind likely to be caused by the dangerous propensities of the species. In Behrens, an elephant’s violent reaction when startled is within that category. Strict liability typically covers personal injury and property damage, including injury to other animals owned by the claimant.
Behrens v. Bertram Mills Circus is a cornerstone case for understanding how strict liability for wild animals operates at common law. It makes clear that liability turns on the inherent danger of the species, not on the care exercised by the keeper, and that foreseeably provoked reactions by wild animals fall within the scope of the risk the keeper assumes.
Equally important, the case illustrates the modern, nuanced approach to defenses: contributory negligence can reduce damages in strict liability actions, but only as to claimants who are themselves at fault, and there is no imputation of fault between claimants. For students, the case provides a compact framework: identify the animal as ferae naturae, confirm the harm is characteristic of the species, consider potential defenses, and assess whether the claimant’s own conduct warrants apportionment.