Master Requested case linked to the slayer rule; citation and jurisdiction needed to brief the actual decision. with this comprehensive case brief.
The so‑called slayer rule is a foundational principle in inheritance law that prevents a person who feloniously and intentionally kills a decedent from profiting by the death—typically by treating the killer as if predeceased the victim. It arises both by statute (often modeled on Uniform Probate Code § 2‑803) and by equitable doctrines (constructive trust) in jurisdictions without a statute. The doctrine implicates difficult intersections of criminal adjudication, civil burdens of proof, public policy, and remedial equity across probate, nonprobate transfers, and insurance proceeds.
You asked for a comprehensive case brief for Barsotti v. Barsotti in the context of the slayer rule. Through my knowledge cutoff, there is no widely cited slayer‑rule decision reported under that caption; without a jurisdiction or reporter citation, I cannot confirm the specific case, parties, or holding. To ensure accuracy and usefulness, this brief outlines the standard legal analysis, issues, rules, and reasoning courts apply in slayer‑rule disputes and flags what a Barsotti v. Barsotti opinion would likely address if it concerns a slayer‑rule contest between family members. If you provide the jurisdiction and citation, I will deliver a precise brief tailored to the actual decision.
Unverified—please provide jurisdiction and reporter cite
The request references a Barsotti v. Barsotti dispute concerning the slayer rule, but no verified citation or jurisdiction is supplied and no published decision under that name is readily identifiable in the slayer‑rule canon. Slayer‑rule cases commonly arise when one spouse or heir kills the decedent and stands to benefit under a will, intestacy, life insurance policy, joint tenancy, payable‑on‑death account, or retirement plan. The typical procedural posture is a probate proceeding or interpleader action in which the estate, a contingent beneficiary, or competing heirs seek a declaration that the alleged slayer is disqualified and that assets pass as though the slayer predeceased the victim, often with a request for a constructive trust over any assets already received. Criminal proceedings may be pending, completed, or absent; civil courts often resolve slayer disqualification on a preponderance of the evidence regardless of the criminal outcome. Without the specific Barsotti record, the foregoing describes the standard factual matrix such a case would present.
Whether a person who feloniously and intentionally kills the decedent may inherit or receive nonprobate benefits from the decedent’s estate or beneficiary designations, and whether disqualification requires a criminal conviction or can be determined in a civil proceeding under a lesser burden of proof.
Modern slayer statutes (e.g., UPC § 2‑803) provide that an individual who feloniously and intentionally kills the decedent is not entitled to any benefit under the decedent’s will or via intestate succession, and is treated as having predeceased the decedent for purposes of beneficiary designations and survivorship interests. Many statutes also reach life insurance, TOD/POD accounts, joint tenancies (which are severed), and other nonprobate transfers. In jurisdictions without a slayer statute, courts apply equitable principles (notably constructive trust) to prevent unjust enrichment, see, e.g., Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506 (1889); Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977). A criminal conviction is generally sufficient but not always necessary; civil courts may find the disqualifying conduct by a preponderance of the evidence even absent or despite a criminal verdict. Killings in self‑defense, by accident, or lacking the requisite intent (including by legally insane persons, depending on jurisdiction) typically do not trigger the slayer bar. Property affected by the bar passes as if the slayer predeceased the decedent, with remainder or contingent beneficiaries taking accordingly; constructive trusts are imposed where legal title has already transferred to the slayer.
Specific holding unknown without the Barsotti jurisdiction and citation. In comparable slayer‑rule cases, courts hold that a person who feloniously and intentionally kills the decedent is disqualified from receiving benefits and is treated as predeceased; courts may reach this conclusion based on a criminal conviction or independent civil findings under a preponderance standard, and they apply the bar to both probate and nonprobate transfers, employing constructive trusts as needed.
Courts implementing the slayer rule invoke the maxim that no one should profit from his or her own wrong. Whether by statute or equity, the analysis typically proceeds in three steps: 1) Threshold culpability: The court determines whether the killing was felonious and intentional. Statutes, commentary, and case law distinguish between murder/manslaughter and non‑culpable or justified killings (self‑defense, accident). Where there is a criminal conviction, many statutes make that conviction conclusive. Absent a conviction, the probate court may independently decide culpability using civil standards of proof. See, e.g., In re Estate of Mahoney, 126 Vt. 31, 220 A.2d 475 (1966) (civil determination sufficient); In re Estate of Kissinger, 206 P.3d 665 (Wash. 2009) (applying statute to nonprobate assets). 2) Scope of disqualification: The court interprets the statute (or equitable doctrine) to determine which transfers are barred. Modern approaches treat the slayer as predeceased for wills, intestacy, beneficiary designations, and survivorship interests. Joint tenancies are typically severed as of the moment before death so the slayer does not acquire the decedent’s share by right of survivorship. Life insurance and retirement plan benefits are redirected to contingent beneficiaries or, absent such, to the estate. Where ERISA‑governed plans are involved, some courts have grappled with preemption; federal common law recognizes a slayer bar consistent with plan documents. See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141 (2001) (preemption of state revocation‑on‑divorce statutes), but numerous federal circuits apply a federal slayer rule for ERISA benefits. 3) Remedy and distribution: If legal title has already passed to the slayer, equity imposes a constructive trust for the benefit of the rightful takers to prevent unjust enrichment. The distribution is then computed as if the slayer predeceased the decedent, preserving contingent gifts and anti‑lapse outcomes. Courts emphasize that the slayer rule is not punitive beyond preventing profit; it does not escheat property to the state but redirects it to innocent successors. Policy considerations—the deterrence of wrongdoing, preservation of testamentary intent (presuming the decedent would not want the killer to benefit), and the integrity of the legal system—support broad application across probate and nonprobate transfers. Courts also stress the differing standards and purposes of criminal and civil proceedings to justify independent civil adjudication even in the face of acquittal.
For law students, the slayer rule is a quintessential intersection of equity and statutory interpretation. It tests your ability to: (1) articulate the culpability threshold (felonious and intentional), (2) track how the rule applies across probate and nonprobate assets, (3) reconcile criminal outcomes with civil standards, (4) deploy constructive trust to correct title after improper transfers, and (5) analyze remedial consequences for joint tenancies, insurance, and beneficiary designations. When briefing an unidentified case like Barsotti v. Barsotti, the key is to map these doctrinal steps and then apply the specific jurisdiction’s statute and precedents once the citation is confirmed.
Usually no. While a felony murder conviction generally satisfies the statute’s culpability requirement, many jurisdictions allow probate courts to determine—by a preponderance of the evidence in a civil proceeding—that the killing was felonious and intentional. Thus, an acquittal does not guarantee eligibility, and a nolo contendere plea may or may not suffice depending on jurisdiction.
Yes in most jurisdictions. Modern statutes and case law extend the bar to nonprobate transfers, treating the slayer as having predeceased the decedent so contingent beneficiaries take instead. If proceeds have already been paid to the slayer, courts impose a constructive trust in favor of the rightful beneficiaries. ERISA plans raise preemption issues, but federal common law recognizes a slayer rule for ERISA benefits.
Courts typically sever the survivorship feature, preventing the killer from accruing the decedent’s share by survivorship. The property is treated as though the slayer predeceased the decedent, with the decedent’s share passing to heirs or devisees, and the slayer retaining only their original undivided interest.
The slayer rule generally requires a felonious and intentional killing; accidental or negligent homicides and justified killings (e.g., self‑defense) do not trigger disqualification. Some statutes address insanity or diminished capacity; outcomes vary by jurisdiction and hinge on whether the conduct is deemed ‘intentional’ or ‘felonious’ under the statute.
Equity supplies a constructive trust over the assets in the slayer’s hands. The court orders the slayer to hold the property for the benefit of the proper heirs or beneficiaries, aligning legal title with the distribution that would have occurred had the slayer predeceased the decedent.
The slayer rule embodies a strong public policy that no person should profit from their own wrong, implemented today through statutes and equitable remedies that collectively bar a killer from taking under wills, intestacy, or nonprobate designations. Courts apply a pragmatic framework: determine culpability, define the scope of disqualification across asset types, and use constructive trust or predeceased‑taker fictions to correct distribution.
To produce a precise, authoritative brief of Barsotti v. Barsotti, please provide the jurisdiction and reporter citation. With that information, I will supply the exact facts, procedural posture, holding, and doctrinal contributions of the case. Until then, the analysis above outlines the issues and reasoning a true Barsotti slayer‑rule decision would necessarily address.