Master Supreme Court decision establishing strong deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation (Auer/Seminole Rock deference). with this comprehensive case brief.
Auer v. Robbins is a cornerstone of modern administrative law because it crystallizes the principle that courts generally defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations. Often called Auer or Seminole Rock deference, this doctrine recognizes that agencies possess subject-matter expertise and institutional responsibility for the texts they promulgate. In Auer, the Supreme Court applied that principle to the Department of Labor’s (DOL) salary-basis regulation that determines whether certain employees are exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act’s (FLSA) overtime provisions.
Beyond its immediate wage-and-hour stakes, Auer has shaped how litigants and courts approach regulatory meaning, especially where the only authoritative guidance appears in interpretive documents or even an agency’s litigation brief. While the Court later narrowed the doctrine’s scope in Kisor v. Wilkie (2019), Auer remains a critical starting point for understanding when and how judicial deference attaches to agency interpretations—and the limits on that deference to prevent unfair surprise and ensure reasoned judgment.
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997)
Petitioners were sergeants and a lieutenant in the St. Louis Police Department who sought overtime pay under the FLSA. The City paid them a fixed biweekly amount and classified them as exempt "executive, administrative, or professional" employees under DOL regulations, which require, among other things, that employees be paid on a "salary basis." The governing DOL regulation provided that an employee is salaried if he or she regularly receives a predetermined amount not subject to reduction because of variations in the quality or quantity of work performed. Petitioners argued they were not salaried because, under departmental and city personnel policies, their pay was theoretically "subject to" deductions for disciplinary violations and occasional budget-induced furloughs. They pointed to portions of the police manual and personnel rules allowing unpaid suspensions or deductions in certain circumstances. However, there was no evidence that petitioners (or similarly situated supervisors) had actually suffered disciplinary pay docking for performance-related reasons, and the City’s furloughs were across-the-board budget measures rather than individualized reductions. The district court granted summary judgment to the City, the Eighth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Whether the police sergeants and lieutenant were paid on a "salary basis" for purposes of the FLSA exemption—and, in deciding that question, whether the court should defer to the Department of Labor’s interpretation of its own salary-basis regulation concerning when pay is "subject to" reduction.
Under Seminole Rock/Auer deference, an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation is controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. Applied to the DOL’s salary-basis rule, an employee’s pay is not deemed "subject to" reduction merely because a policy could theoretically allow deductions; the salary-basis test is defeated only if there is either (1) an actual practice of making such deductions, or (2) a clear and particularized policy—one that effectively communicates that deductions will be made in specified circumstances—creating a significant likelihood of such deductions. Budgetary, across-the-board furloughs do not defeat the salary-basis test.
The Court deferred to the DOL’s interpretation of its salary-basis regulation and held that petitioners were paid on a salary basis. Because there was no actual practice of disciplinary deductions and no clear and particularized policy effectively communicating that pay would be docked in specified circumstances, the exemption applied. The judgment for the City was affirmed.
1) Ambiguity and deference: The Court began by recognizing that the salary-basis regulation’s phrase "subject to reduction" was ambiguous in application. It then applied Seminole Rock/Auer deference, holding that the DOL’s interpretation—advanced in an amicus brief—was entitled to controlling weight unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. The Court rejected the argument that deference was improper because the interpretation came via a litigation brief; what matters is whether the agency’s position reflects its fair and considered judgment and is consistent with the text and prior positions, not the document in which it appears. 2) Reasonableness of DOL’s interpretation: The DOL construed "subject to" to require something more than a theoretical possibility of docking. In the agency’s view, a salaried employee loses the exemption only if (a) the employer has an actual practice of making deductions that are inconsistent with salaried status, or (b) there exists a clear and particularized policy effectively communicating that specified deductions will, in fact, be made, creating a significant likelihood of deductions. This reading, the Court explained, aligns with the regulatory purpose of distinguishing salaried pay from hourly or piecework compensation and avoids defeating the exemption based on hypothetical or unenforced rules. 3) Application to the facts: The record showed no actual practice of docking petitioners’ pay for performance- or discipline-related reasons. Although personnel rules and the police manual referenced potential suspensions or deductions, the policies did not amount to a clear and particularized directive effectively communicating that such deductions would be imposed on these salaried supervisors in specified circumstances. The Court also agreed with the DOL that across-the-board, budget-driven furloughs do not undermine salaried status because they are not tied to the quality or quantity of an individual employee’s work and do not transform the employee into an hourly worker. 4) Litigation-position and unfair-surprise limits: The Court emphasized that deference would not be owed to post hoc rationalizations or interpretations that produce unfair surprise. Here, however, the DOL’s reading was consistent with the regulation and prior agency guidance and thus reflected the agency’s fair and considered judgment. Because the DOL’s interpretation was reasonable and the City’s policies neither established an actual docking practice nor a clear, particularized pay-docking regime for petitioners, the sergeants and lieutenant were salaried and exempt from FLSA overtime.
Auer is the leading case on judicial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation, often cited together with Bowles v. Seminole Rock. It instructs courts to defer to an agency’s reasonable reading of ambiguous regulatory text, even when the interpretation appears in formats short of formal rulemaking, so long as it reflects the agency’s fair and considered judgment and is not plainly inconsistent with the regulation. In practice, Auer significantly affects administrative litigation strategy—agencies often defend rules by explaining them in briefs, while challengers argue lack of ambiguity, inconsistency, or unfair surprise. For FLSA and employment law, Auer clarifies the salary-basis test by distinguishing theoretical from actual or clearly communicated pay docking. More broadly, the decision set the stage for later refinements in Kisor v. Wilkie (2019), which narrowed but did not overrule Auer by requiring a rigorous threshold inquiry into genuine ambiguity, reasoned expertise-based interpretation, and fair-notice constraints.
If a regulation is genuinely ambiguous after applying all the traditional tools of interpretation, courts defer to the agency’s interpretation so long as it is reasonable and reflects the agency’s fair and considered judgment, and does not create unfair surprise or conflict with the regulation’s text. In Auer, the Court found the DOL’s interpretation of its salary-basis rule reasonable and controlling.
Yes, potentially. Auer held that an interpretation advanced in an agency’s amicus brief can be owed deference if it represents the agency’s fair and considered judgment and is consistent with the regulation. Deference is not automatic; courts will withhold it for post hoc rationalizations or positions that would unfairly surprise regulated parties.
The Court adopted the DOL’s interpretation that the salary-basis test is not defeated by a theoretical possibility of pay docking. Instead, an employee’s pay is "subject to" reduction only if there is an actual practice of making impermissible deductions or a clear and particularized policy effectively communicating that such deductions will be made in specified circumstances, creating a significant likelihood of deductions.
No. The Court accepted the DOL’s view that across-the-board, budget-driven furloughs do not undermine salaried status because they are not tied to the quality or quantity of an individual’s work and do not convert salaried compensation into hourly pay.
Kisor narrowed Auer by imposing gatekeeping requirements: a court must first exhaust the traditional tools of construction and find genuine ambiguity; it must then ensure the agency’s interpretation is reasonable, within its substantive expertise, reflects its fair and considered judgment, and does not cause unfair surprise. Kisor keeps Auer deference but makes it harder to obtain.
First, determine whether the regulation is genuinely ambiguous after applying text, structure, context, history, and purpose. Second, assess whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable, expert-driven, consistent over time, and publicly signaled (to avoid unfair surprise). Third, test for limiting principles: Is the interpretation plainly inconsistent with the regulatory text? Is the agency merely advancing a convenient litigation position? Finally, apply the interpretation to the facts, as Auer did in evaluating salary-basis status.
Auer v. Robbins entrenched a powerful form of regulatory deference by instructing courts to accept an agency’s reasonable interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation. In the FLSA context, it clarified that salaried status turns on actual practices or clearly communicated docking policies—not hypothetical possibilities—and that budgetary furloughs do not, by themselves, destroy salaried status.
For administrative law, Auer remains a foundational case, even after Kisor’s narrowing. It teaches students to separate questions of regulatory ambiguity from questions of interpretive reasonableness and fair notice, and to evaluate whether an agency’s position is a considered and consistent explanation rather than an ad hoc litigation stance.